University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

1-1-2019

A Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: Majoritarian Rules and
Electoral Violence in Africa
Gavin M. Kiger
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd
Part of the African Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Kiger, Gavin M., "A Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: Majoritarian Rules and Electoral Violence in
Africa" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1588.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1588

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

A Comparative Study of Electoral Systems:
Majoritarian Rules and Electoral Violence in Africa

__________

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

__________

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

__________

by
Gavin M. Kiger
June 2019
Advisor: Timothy Sisk

©Copyright by Gavin M. Kiger 2019
All Rights Reserved

Author: Gavin M. Kiger
Title: A Comparative Study of Electoral Systems:
Majoritarian Rules and Electoral Violence in Africa
Advisor: Timothy Sisk
Degree Date: June 2019
Abstract
An increasing trend of violent elections is undermining the former optimism over
multi-party elections in Africa. Electoral systems are frequently associated with election
violence, but the effects of different systems are relatively unknown. This study addresses
this gap and assesses whether conditions for election violence are greater under certain
electoral systems compared to others. Using a new time-series cross sectional (TSCS)
dataset, I conduct an analysis of election violence in sub-Saharan Africa from 1995-2013.
Overall, I find evidence for the violence-permitting nature of majoritarian systems, and
the violence-constraining nature of proportional representation systems. These findings
remain after controlling for the timing of violence (in relation to the election), the effect
of informal institutions, and the presence of violence-mobilizing factors.
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I. Introduction
Electoral democracies are increasingly more common among states. International
IDEA notes that since 1975, the percent of states holding democratic elections has grown
from around 30 percent to nearly 70 percent (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). This trend
represents promising expansion, yet electoral democracies are not free from instability.
The Center for Systemic Peace explains that partial democracies (anocracies), are highly
vulnerable to political instability, often during election periods (Marshall & ElzingaMarshall, 2017). As such, it is important to uncover the conditions that make these
periods potentially destabilizing.
Elections are competitive by design, and often invoke strong feelings, divisive
rhetoric, and ideological clashes. The ballot box represents a political battleground, where
voters can exercise accountability and express political preferences. Rightly managed,
elections are an invaluable tool in democratic processes. However, elections introduce
uncertainty and vulnerability, which can lead to acts of violence. Already Benin, Nigeria,
and Senegal have witnessed election violence in 2019. Yet uncertainty and vulnerability
alone are not enough to produce election violence, raising questions around the specific
causes.
Uncovering the causes of election violence is a crucial first step in mitigating its
effects, and preventing it in the future. In this study, I investigate the causes of election
1

violence, focusing on elections in Africa from 1995-2013. From a theoretical standpoint,
I choose to focus on electoral systems. I find that majoritarian systems, those that raise
the stakes of electoral competition, are more highly associated with election violence.
This holds true when controlling for the timing of violence, the role of informal
institutions, and escalatory/mobilizing factors.
By narrowing the focus to sub-Saharan Africa, I can more clearly investigate the
conditions under which election violence occurs. Rather than taking Africa as inherently
different or violent, I focus on the continent because of its similar context (post-colonial,
growing multi-party systems), illustrative cases (e.g. Kenya 2007/8 and Cote d’Ivoire
2010), and variation in electoral systems and institutions.
Even with the frequency of election violence in Africa, scholars do not have a
fully comprehensive understanding of its many causes. Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor
explain that between 1990 and 2008, nearly 60 percent of African elections faced
electoral violence (Straus & Taylor, 2012). This statistic starkly contrasts with the
optimism of the 1990s, where over 75 percent of states adopted multiparty elections after
the Cold War (Burchard, 2015). Many framed the ‘90s rush of multiparty elections as a
turning point for democracy on the continent. Caught in the rhetoric behind Huntington’s
“third wave,” and Fukuyama’s “End of History,” observers argued Africa was catching
up, and finally adopting Western forms of liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2006;
Huntington, 1993). Today, the problematic assumptions behind such claims are clear, and
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their inaccuracies no better demonstrated than through the frequent cases of electoral
violence broadcasted across many African states.1
The 2011 general election in Nigeria was praised for its management in the runup, but featured widespread violence, with over 800 killed and 65,000 displaced after
results were announced (Bekoe, 2011). In Kenya, a disputed election in 2007 led to over
1,000 deaths, nearly 650,000 displaced, and the brink of civil war (HRW, 2017). Pierre
Nkurunziza’s announcement to run for a constitutionally prohibited third term in Burundi
sparked massive demonstrations, a coup attempt, and large-scale coercive violence from
the government (Bouka, 2017). These three examples help highlight the prevalence and
severity of election violence, and demonstrate the need for continued research. Large
scale research projects, such as the Electoral Integrity Project,2 are helping address
questions around failed and/or violent elections, and illustrate the growing demand for
work in this area.
While election violence in Africa certainly exists, it is incorrect to characterize
“African elections” as exclusively violent. This simplification of elections in Africa is
reminiscent of Africa as the “Dark Continent” and the “Heart of Darkness,” and
overlooks diversity among the 54 unique African states. In reality, for every case of
violence in Kenya or Nigeria, there are peaceful and competitive elections in states like
Botswana and Ghana. The variation and different experiences with elections and violence

1

The neo-colonial implications of imposing Western systems on African states is highly problematic.
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A joint project between Harvard University and the University of Sydney under the guidance of Pippa
Norris.
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among African states begs the question: under what conditions are elections accompanied
by political violence?
In pursuit of answers, approaches emphasizing the role of institutions are
becoming increasingly common and important (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016). In particular,
many are beginning to question the role of electoral system design, and the unique ways
proportionality inherent (or absent) in electoral processes contributes to violence. This
line of thinking has roots in the literature on deeply divided societies, and generally
supports the notion that majoritarian rules are more violence-inducing than their
proportional representation (PR) counterparts (Reynolds, 2010). However, statistical
evidence supporting this finding is relatively scarce, and often overlooks the complexity
found in different cases (Bogaards, 2013). Observationally, Kenya and Nigeria’s
majoritarian rules suggest the ill-suited nature of winner-takes-all systems. However,
violence in PR states like Togo and South Africa, and a lack of violence in majoritarian
Botswana suggest that further study is necessary (Bekoe, 2010; Bruce, 2009; Charlton,
1993; Reynolds, 2010).
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the growing literature on the causes
of election violence, specifically with regard to the many electoral systems underpinning
each election. What follows is a quantitative analysis of electoral violence, taking
institutions, and specifically electoral systems, as the main explanatory variable. Relying
on a new dataset of electoral violence, the Countries at Risk of Election Violence
(CREV), I replicate and expand on Fjelde and Höglund’s recent statistical analysis of
election violence and electoral systems. Where previous authors neglect the timing of
elections, I help fill the gap.
4

The findings generally support the notion that majoritarian rules are more
frequently tied to election violence. However, this trend only exists at certain times for
particular actors. Furthermore, the context of informal institutions like neopatrimonialism, as well as the presence of excluded groups, armed conflict, election
monitors, and fraud are all additional factors that work alongside electoral systems.
Considering all of this, no single system is inherently better, yet opting for greater
proportionality may help mitigate the ill-effects of structural risks for election violence.
This study adheres to the following organization. In the next section, I present an
overview of the principal literature on elections, their importance for democracy, and
how scholars currently think about the causes of electoral violence. Here, I also suggest a
clear definition of electoral violence that helps guide my analysis. In the third section of
this study, I offer my theoretical framework and a short discussion around the role of
electoral systems. The section concludes with the main hypotheses. Section four presents
the data and methods I use to analyze election violence. In the fifth section I present the
results of my analysis, before moving to a discussion of the findings and final
conclusions in section six.

5

II. Democracy, Elections, & Electoral Violence
Elections and Democracy
The topic of democratization in Africa is far beyond the scope of this study, but it
is a major reason scholars and policymakers are interested in election violence. Election
violence matters for human security, regional stability, sustainable development, postconflict peacebuilding, and a wide range of other topics. However, the necessary link
between elections and democracy warrants a short discussion on their relationship.
Elections are a vital outward demonstration of democratic systems. Since the
widespread adoption of democratic norms among modern (and largely Western) states,
frequent elections have become a mainstay of political society on a global scale. When
they are well-managed, elections offer an outlet for healthy and necessary political
competition. Theoretical ideal types of democracy, like Robert Dahl’s polyarchy,
stipulate elections as a necessary attribute in large part for this reason (Dahl, 1998). In
fact, some procedural definitions of democracy are based solely around holding regular
and competitive elections (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). As such,
one may look at the health of elections when assessing the state of democracy in a
particular context.
However, simply holding elections does not indicate the presence of a vibrant
democracy. Elections are also common among non-democratic systems. Termed hybrid
6

regimes, states that engage in electoral competition, yet tend to disregard civil rights and
liberties present in most “consolidated democracies,”3 are at higher risk for election
violence (Mainwaring, Brinks, Pérez-Liñán, & Munk, 2007). Often the decision to hold
elections in non-democratic societies stems from political elites. Given the normative and
practical importance of elections, non-democratic governments often hold elections
hoping to earn legitimacy from the international community (or demanding constituents;
Gandhi, 2008). This can often lead to violence when these same governments attempt to
ensure favorable electoral outcomes (through coercive measures).
Even well-intentioned states (those deemed more-or-less democratic) are at risk of
election violence, simply given the competitive nature of electoral events. The basic point
is that elections are important and common across most modern states. Some of these
states are at higher risk for violence than others. However, not all states at risk for
violence actually experience election violence. The differences here have implications for
human rights and security, development, sustainable peace, and democracy. As such, it is
very important to understand the causes of election violence.

Electoral Violence
This next section looks at the drivers and consequences of electoral violence.
Electoral violence starkly contrasts with the overarching goal of elections: offering a
peaceful means to political power. Elections provide elites legitimacy, and allow voters to
exercise accountability, choose representatives, and exercise voice (Sisk, 2017).

3

The idea of democratic consolidation is problematic.
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However, it is unsurprising that elections sometimes incite violence. They are conflict
inducing and produce losers by nature, opening windows of vulnerability that often lead
to violence (Höglund, 2006). Most elections across the world are peaceful, suggesting
that violence is not necessarily a direct byproduct of voting, but an anomaly that occurs
under certain conditions. The remainder of this section is devoted to defining electoral
violence, and working through the various conditions under which it appears.

Defining “Electoral Violence”
Electoral violence is a more specific form of political violence. Political violence
refers to physical, psychological, and symbolic damage towards people and/or property
intended to influence political, social, or cultural change (Bosi & Malthaner, 2015). As a
narrower form of political violence, electoral violence always occurs within the context
of elections.
Straus and Taylor note the lack of a consistent definition of “electoral violence,”
and propose the following: “physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to
an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral result” (Straus & Taylor,
2012). Straus and Taylor’s approach mirrors earlier definitions like that offered by
Fischer (2002), which highlights violence as a strategy. Fjelde and Hogulnd similarly
emphasize the strategic nature of election-related violence, but note that bottom-up
protests against electoral events can also turn violent (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016). Sisk
defines electoral violence as “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm
perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral
competition” (Sisk, 2008).
8

Each definition draws on a set of similar assumptions, largely related to timing
and motive. Höglund explains that timing and motive are the most important factors in
distinguishing electoral violence (Höglund, 2009). Electoral violence always includes a
temporal aspect in that it occurs during the electoral cycle (in either pre-electoral,
electoral, or post-electoral periods). Similarly, its motives are connected to the electoral
process, as opposed to other types of violence that occur during the cycle, but have “no
direct bearing on the election” (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017).
Along with timing and motive, it is possible to delineate three additional
dimensions of electoral violence: type, method, and actors. Taken together these five
dimensions help establish a more procedural definition of election violence. This line of
thinking draws on the work of Burchard, who offers a clearer definition to account for the
effects of electoral institutions. She provides a framework for assessing election violence,
separating violence by type, means, timing, and actor (Burchard, 2015). This framework
helps unite the somewhat disconnected set of definitions currently present in the
literature. Each dimension, and its utility, is described in detail below.
The first dimension is timing, which relates to the electoral cycle. Timing is an
important and easily measurable aspect of election violence. While political violence can
occur anytime, election violence is unique in its proximity to an upcoming (or recently
held) election. The electoral cycle approach, developed by International IDEA and the
European Commission, identifies three specific periods around elections. The preelection period, election period, and post-election period are important distinctions
policymakers and scholars use when designing election, but are also relevant for election
violence. Timing is important as it influences the nature and purpose of the violence
9

employed. A visual representation of the electoral cycle is displayed in Figure 2.1 (from:
Alihodžić, 2011).
Figure 2.1: Election Cycles

Motives are the second dimension, and one of the most controversial. Many argue
that for violence to be electoral in nature, it must be aimed at influencing electoral
processes or outcomes. Intimidating voters during election-day, assassinating political
opponents in the run-up, and violently rioting against recently announced results are all
examples with clear motive. However, some like Elizabeth Murray and Jonas Claes argue
10

that such a distinction is problematic, especially in contexts “where violence is
commonplace and investigations are scant” (Claes, 2016, p. 4; Murray, 2016). Instead,
they propose focusing more closely on the targets (people and objects related to
elections) and the context (elections; Alihodžić, 2011; Claes, 2016).
Type, the third dimension, is equally contentious. Burchard splits electoral
violence into two distinct types: incidental and strategic. Incidental violence is unplanned
and often involves protestors or “over-zealous security forces” (Burchard, 2015).
Strategic violence, however, is pre-planned and “deliberately employed” (Burchard,
2015). This distinction relates to the work of Donald Horowitz, who argues that ethnic
violence (violence from one group directed at another) is hardly ever irrational or
unplanned, even if highly emotional (Horowitz, 2001).
Though the specific object of intent may differ between cases of violence, it is
important to recognize that each form of motive falls within the wider umbrella of
influencing electoral outcomes (Höglund, 2009). Much like measuring motives, however,
accurately measuring the “type” is also difficult.4 Furthermore, many question the fact
that electoral violence is ever “incidental” (Ellman & Wantchekon, 2000).
Overall, the second and third dimensions are an important conceptual
characteristic of election violence. Nevertheless, their measurability is highly
questionable, which may warrant removal from narrower procedural definitions.
The fourth dimension of electoral violence deals with methods. Here, Sisk and
Spies offer the most useful approach, describing the various methods involved in the

4

There are also debates around the relevance of including an “incidental” form of electoral violence.
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perpetration of electoral violence. The specific activities included are assassinations of
challengers, brawls between rival groups, and “threats, coercion, and intimidation of
opponents, voters, or election officials” (Sisk & Spies, 2009). These actions fall into two
broader categories: threats and attacks. The dichotomous framing builds on Sisk’s
definition, and matches the typology of violence found in this study’s dataset. The main
distinction between the two is the presence (or absence) of physical violence. From a
procedural point-of-view, method is much easier to categorize.
The final dimension deals with the actors involved in electoral violence. Different
actors employ violence with unique actions at different times for various reasons (though
all generally related to electoral influence). Many studies tend to focus on state elites
perpetrating election violence against civilians, but the range of actors involved is much
more widespread. Claes and Murray agree with scholars like Sead Alihodzic, who
emphasizes the importance of distinguishing electoral violence by actions involving
“electoral actors” (Alihodžić, 2011, p. 27). It is useful to delineate such actors, but the
term “electoral actors” is vague and possibly obscuring. For this study, electoral actors
are individuals involved either directly or indirectly with electoral processes. It includes
voters, election candidates, incumbent governments, security forces, international
monitors, and anyone else related to the election. For the sake of simplicity, this study
categorizes actors into two groups: state and non-state actors.5 State actors are those
associated with the current government (such as incumbents and security forces), while
non-state actors comprise the wide range of individuals who fall outside the government.

5

Perpetrators may direct these activities at either people or objects to carry out their goals.
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This five-dimensional description of electoral violence is necessary to help guide
theory around why election violence occurs. Many studies fail to distinguish between
these parts, possibly obscuring analysis. Future studies on the causes and effects of
electoral violence would do well to adopt clear and measurable definitions. Table 2.1
presents a visual representation of this definition.
Table 2.1: Five-Dimensions of Electoral Violence
Timing
Pre-Electoral, Electoral, Post-Electoral
Motive
Influencing Processes or Outcomes
Type
Incidental vs Strategic
Method
Attacks vs Threats
Actor
State vs Non-State

Causes of Electoral Violence
This next section presents a broad overview of the current literature on the causes
of electoral violence. Although there is a large amount of empirical evidence on electoral
violence, few scholars have detailed a conceptual overview of its many causes. Höglund
separates the causes of electoral violence into three different categories: the nature of
politics, the nature of elections, and electoral institutions (Höglund, 2009). Sisk explains
that electoral violence stems from social structural conditions, electoral system choice
and the stakes of political competition, the neutrality and competence of electoral
administration, and the nature and functioning of the security sector (Rao, 2014). Both
hint at the different ways electoral processes and institutions create space for violence,
but also emphasize contexts not directly related to elections.
International IDEA has a toolkit that builds on these distinctions. IDEA’s
Electoral Risk Management Framework distinguishes between internal and external
13

factors of violence to help organize the causes of electoral violence (IDEA, 2018). To
best wade through the general literature on causes of conflict, it will be necessary to look
at these two different groups, but also within the context of a third group: triggers of
violence. Beyond this broad structure, many studies group their findings based on the
timing of election violence. After reviewing the general causes found in the literature, I
will present the current state of findings distinguished by timing of violence. Splitting the
causes into these sections is necessary due to the informative nature of more general
work, and also the growing recognition that the causes of violence vary depending on
proximity (timing) to the actual election.

External Causes
External, or structural explanations for election violence focus on how unique
social, cultural, and economic conditions reinforce and prompt the use of violence. These
are external to the electoral process itself, and “relate to exogenous conditions which can
trigger… election-related violence” (Alihodžić & Burcher, 2013). Structural causes
include democratizing contexts, levels of socio-political exclusion and inequality,
previous experiences with violence, post-conflict scenarios, and other external, contextspecific factors.
This group includes what Högulnd calls, “the nature of politics” (Höglund, 2009).
Here, she highlights the role of patrimonialism, arguing that it can “foster electoral
violence” by encouraging corruption, and marginalizing the population (Höglund, 2009).
Neo-patrimonialism is an important condition to recognize, and refers to a relationship
where well-endowed patrons distribute resources through client-networks in return for
14

support. These patrons are often political figures that claim dominion over the resources
they administer. Disrupting these chains and networks can be devastating and violent
(Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001).
On a similar note, Cyllah finds that a disregard for the rule of law, and a culture of
impunity can underpin election violence (Cyllah, 2014). When election violence goes
unpunished, the perceived costs of its use decrease. In countries where minorities are
generally excluded, they are also found to be more at risk of electoral violence (Berry,
Bouka, & Kamuru, 2017). Others find that elections in autocracies, and those in poorer
countries tend to experience election violence more frequently (Salehyan & Linebarger,
2015; Straus & Taylor, 2012).
Many of the structural causes here are similar to those found in countries with
recent experiences of armed conflict. Deeply divided societies facing grievances from
previous conflict are often ill-suited for electoral competition, and at high risk for
electoral violence (World Bank, 2018). Salehyan and Linebarger agree, finding that
countries in the midst of conflict, and those not-far-removed experience more violent
elections (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015). Where identity is contentious and salient, some
like Bates suggest that “electoral competition arouses ethnic conflict” (Bates, 1983, p.
161). Other pertinent factors include socio-economic inequality, political marginalization,
and even the presence of organized crime (Alihodžić & Burcher, 2013).
Violence around elections is often a result of the high stakes associated with
winning and losing. In cases where institutions may contribute to zero-sum politics, and
the structural factors make the consequences of losing high, there is a greater risk for
electoral violence. Building on Höglund (2009), neo-patrimonial structures can also
15

heighten electoral consequences in the context of limited resources (Chabal & Daloz,
1999; Van de Walle, 2001). Here, actors may resort to electoral violence to monopolize
political and economic power. Taylor, Pevehuse, and Straus find evidence for this among
incumbents (Taylor, Pevehouse, & Straus, 2017).
While deep-rooted structural conditions are necessary to consider when looking at
the causes of election violence, they are not sufficient for explaining conflict entirely.
Even though states with higher levels of poverty, ethnic fractionalization, and neopatrimonial politics may be a greater risk, there are many with similar characteristics that
avoid violence around elections.

Internal Causes
The next set of causes deal more specifically with factors directly related to the
electoral process. The electoral rules, vote counting mechanisms, and laws surrounding
parties, campaigning, and voter registration are all included in this group of causes. Most
importantly, this is where the nature of the elections and electoral institutions manifest.
Fortman argues that in cases where the nature of the elections have the potential to
actually change power relations, violence is possible (Fortman, 1999). Additionally, in
highly inflammatory elections, strong political rhetoric during campaigns can lead to
violence, especially in the context of a divided society (Wilkinson, 2006). More recently,
Opitz, Fjelde, and Höglund claim that inclusive election monitoring boards can help
mitigate violence (Opitz, Fjelde, & Höglund, 2013). This relates more broadly to how
actors view the integrity of elections. Norris finds that in cases where electoral integrity is
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low, violence is more likely (Norris, 2012). All of these studies demonstrate the various
ways internal factors can lead to electoral violence.
An additional internal factor concerns electoral systems. These systems make up
the rules needed for translating votes cast into seats received. Scholars argue that these
rules can be conflict permitting under certain conditions. The major debate is around
plurality systems, where the winner-takes-all, versus proportional systems, where the
spoils are shared. Sara Birch finds that winner-takes-all systems provoke election
violence, and must be avoided in contexts where political competition is already
contentious (Birch, 2005). Electoral systems fit into an institutional approach to election
violence. Section 3 below explains this approach, and the role of electoral systems in
greater detail.
Beyond electoral systems, majority-rules institutions in general tend to correlate
with violence and instability. A major finding in this regard comes from differences
between presidential and parliamentary systems. These systems define the nature of the
relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of government. Similar to
majoritarian/plurality electoral systems, presidential rules tend to abide by a winnertakes-all formula. Many like Juan Linz argue for the perils of presidentialism in
struggling democracies, largely because of these rules, and the powers afforded to single
individuals in presidential systems (Linz, 1996). However, others argue that the
distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems is not always clear-cut, and
transitioning from one to another can be highly destabilizing (Mainwaring & Shugart,
1997). These sources of instability, and the differing stakes of electoral competition under

17

presidential or parliamentary systems are important internal contexts when studying
election violence.

Escalatory Triggers
Internal and external conditions alone are not enough to create violence, which
normally requires a trigger to emerge. The intersection between structural and internal
causes can occur through the various escalatory dynamics associated with electoral
violence. Sisk and Spies note that electoral violence is related to stakes, expectations,
outcomes, and incentives (Sisk & Spies, 2009). Certain external structures (like neopatrimonialism) can produce expectations that, when threatened, can serve as a source of
escalation.
Violence is also linked to expectations. In cases where outcomes are unclear,
certain candidates may find violence attractive. This is especially true when challenged
incumbents receive information suggesting they will lose (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, &
Jablonski, 2014). Clear outcomes can also lead to electoral violence. When parties or
actors expect exclusion from political power, violence offers a way “to either prevent
their exclusion or to prevent the election’s success” (Sisk & Spies, 2009).
A final escalatory dynamic involves incentives. Incentives deal with how the rules
of the game rewards certain behaviors or actions in the electoral process (Sisk & Spies,
2009). Depending on the context, different institutions may encourage ethnic
entrepreneurs and ethnic outbidding, or force party leaders to reach across identity groups
for support (Horowitz, 1985; Sisk & Spies, 2009). The former often leading to electoral
violence, and the latter more inclusive politics.
18

The literature on general factors and conditions is highly valuable, but tends to
ignore the analytical importance of violence timing. In doing so, it becomes difficult to
accurately aim interventions meant to prevent election violence. One of the contributions
of this study is its attention to the differences in election violence timing, so it is useful to
now turn towards the most recent work looking at this.

Pre-Election Violence
Studies focusing on the causes of pre-election violence tend to emphasize the role
of violence in influencing outcomes through voter intimidation. Recognizing that motives
are empirically difficult to measure, a large portion of pre-election theory agrees that
violence is employed to alter voter behavior and/or turn-out (Burchard, 2015). The theory
is closely tied to the consequences of winning and losing elections. In cases where the
overall closeness or competitiveness of elections is high, violence is more likely.
Höglund (2009), Straus and Taylor (2012) and Hafner-Burton et al (2014) all find that
when the closeness of elections increases the likelihood of violence in pre-election
periods also increases. Incumbents are often unwilling to vacate the benefits of office,
and will result to violence if deemed necessary. This argument is consistent with the
findings from Taylor, Pevehuse, and Straus (2017), Straus and Taylor (2012), and Fjelde
and Höglund (2016) who all explain that pre-election violence is primarily perpetrated by
incumbents (Taylor et al., 2017).
Another line of thinking emphasizes exclusion as a cause of violence, often from
ethnic minorities or restricted political opposition. Here, the focus is on non-state actors
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(like opposition groups), and how the fear of exclusion can lead to violent outbursts in
pre-electoral periods (Wilkinson, 2006).
Finally, the presence of international monitors has the potential to incite election
violence in the pre-electoral period. Specifically, Daxecker finds that successful
punishment of election fraud has provoked domestic elites to shift “violent manipulation”
to the pre-election period to “avoid negative publicity and punishment” (Daxecker, 2014,
p. 232). Interestingly, these higher levels of pre-violence coincide with less violence
during elections and in the post-election period. These findings contrast with a study from
Hannah Smidt, who argues that the effect of international observers is only apparent
when controlling for perpetrator type (Smidt, 2016). She finds that while observers can
deter government forces, they can actually provoke opposition groups into using violence
(Smidt, 2016).
Even though pre-election violence is understood as a unique and important
category of electoral violence more broadly, scholars readily admit that “the causes and
consequences of pre-election violence are poorly understood” (Daxecker, 2014, p. 233).

Election Day
There is less literature around violence on election day(s), but it still warrants
review. Fischer explains that violence on election day occurs when rivalries play out at
the ballot box. For example, supporters of the opposition party and the ruling party in
Yemen began arguing at counting centers, and resorted to violence when the dispute
escalated (Fischer, 2002).
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Most of the theory around violence on election day is similar to the dynamics of
pre-election violence. Daxecker explains that in both cases, actors are aiming to influence
outcomes through voter suppression (Daxecker, 2014).

Post-Election Violence
The final time under review concerns the post-election period and violence. Both
Burchard and Daxecker explain that post-election violence has a long history of
theoretical studies (Burchard, 2015; Daxecker, 2012). Smidt explains that the basic
theory around post-electoral violence can be divided between governments and
opposition groups. The governments are primarily concerned with deterring and
suppressing dissent, while opposition groups engage in violence “as a form of protest
against fraud, repression, unfavorable outcomes and socio-economic grievances” (Smidt,
2016, p. 227). There are many studies and empirical cases to support these distinctions.
For example, after the disputed 2001 elections in Chad, opposition supporters took to the
streets in protest, and were “violently dispersed by government security forces” (Fischer,
2002, p. 13). The violence in Kenya and Nigeria is also linked to post-election dynamics.
In this section, I argued for a clearer definition of election violence, and for the
need to separate causes based on timing. I now turn to the theoretical argument
underpinning my statistical analysis around electoral systems and election violence.
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III. Conceptual Orientation
The main theoretical components of my analysis are rooted in a largely neoinstitutional orientation, but also emphasize the importance of actor mobilization for
violence to occur. This section is devoted to explaining the many ways electoral violence
is possible under unique electoral institutional settings. In particular, the focus is on
electoral systems.

Institutions
The emphasis on electoral system design stems from a neo-institutional
perspective. Put broadly, institutions make up the various rules, norms, and structures that
constrain the behaviors of different actors (Miller, 2011). Crucially, these rules and
norms can be formally codified, or informally recognized (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).
Elections, the electoral systems that define their scope, and the myriad set of processes,
rules, and structures in states all fall within the scope of institutions. When studying
electoral violence, it is useful and necessary to consider the institutional settings that
either provoke, permit, or constrain the emergence of violence.
This form of institutionalism comes from March and Olsen’s seminal work on
institutions (March & Olsen, 1984). Here, the authors depart from the idea that
institutions simply mirror society, or act only as an arena for actors to exercise rational
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choice (though rational choice is still important). They argue instead for a logic of
appropriateness, where institutions organize “acceptable” behavior (March & Olsen,
1984). Scholars hardly debate the significance of institutions anymore, with most of the
focus on the extent, processes, and conditions that make institutions important (March &
Olsen, 2011). Elections offer a means for democracies to peacefully transfer power, and
strengthen the legitimacy of governments (Diamond, 2006). Considering the importance
of elections for democracies, the rules that define appropriate behavior towards elections
are equally vital.
Electoral systems are the main formal institution covered in this study. By settling
on electoral systems, I am questioning whether the specific types of rules in electoral
processes are more conducive to violence than others. Taagapera likens electoral systems
to containers. Though the contents are frequently more interesting, if the containers “leak,
crack, overflow or corrode, they do affect the outcome” (Taagepera, 1998). Electoral
systems are the backbone of elections, and any related study should consider their role.
An institutionalist framework helps demonstrate the importance of electoral systems
(which goes beyond that of a container). While a single system is unlikely to cause
violence alone, different types may provoke more violence under certain conditions than
others. Following Fjelde and Höglund, as well as a number of African scholars and
experts in the region, I also consider the role of neo-patrimonialism as an informal
institution. How actors perceive the relationship between formal and informal institutions
structures the types of actions and behaviors available.
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Electoral Systems
On the most basic level, electoral systems make up the “set of rules that structure
how votes are cast at elections… and how these votes are then converted into seats”
(Michael Gallagher & Paul Mitchell, 2018). They exist as the formal rules of the electoral
game. Many different options of electoral systems are available, but most fall into one of
three distinct families: Plurality/Majoritarian, Proportional Representation, and Mixed.
Figure 3.1 displays a summary of the electoral system families (adapted from: Menocal,
2011). Proportional representation (PR) systems are those most carefully designed to
“match the percentage of votes cast… with the percentage of seats gained,” while
plurality or majoritarian systems are based on either the principle of plurality, or simple
majority rule (Sisk, 2017). Mixed systems feature elements of both, and are harder to
classify.
Figure 3.1: Electoral System Families
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This classification of electoral systems is more based on mechanics, rather than
outputs. Outputs look at the process of transferring votes into seats, and classify systems
based on either proportional, or non-proportional outcomes (Farrell, 2011). Conversely,
mechanics classifications focus more on how the process creates such outcomes. It relies
on three measurements: district magnitude, electoral formula, and ballot structure
(Farrell, 2011). Of these three, district magnitude (M) deserves special attention. Among
election specialists, there is “near-universal agreement” that district magnitude is the
“crucial determinant of an electoral system’s ability to translate votes cast into seats won
proportionally” (ACE, 2019). District magnitude refers to the size of constituencies in
terms of the total number of seats available. For example, in a district with a magnitude
of 1 (a single member district), there is only 1 available seat for candidates to win
(increasing the percentage of votes needed). In districts with higher magnitudes, the
percentage of votes needed to win a seat is less (if M = 6, there are six seats available,
allowing voters to achieve more proportional outcomes).
From an institutional perspective, elections and electoral systems are greatly
significant. Electoral systems are highly visible institutions. They are also one of the most
exploitable aspects of society. New democracies often adopt particular types of systems
to maximize prospects for consolidation, and ease tensions during transitions (Reynolds,
1999). However, actors often view elections as a way to “manipulate the system and
structures” for personal gain, normally at the expense of others (World Bank, 2018, p.
147). It is therefore important to consider how different types of electoral systems
influence the behavior of those participating in the overall electoral process.
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Effects of Electoral Systems
Institutional perspectives emphasize the importance of electoral systems in unique
ways. Some consider how the type of system influences parties. Maurice Duverger was
one of the first to look at how institutions around elections constrain behavior. He found
that systems tending towards majoritarian rules often produce two-party systems, while
more proportional rules lead to multi-party systems (Taagepera, 2009). Some consider
how the institutional rules influence party behavior, political coalitions, and voting
behavior (Grofman, 2009; Reilly, 2006).
Others note the importance of electoral systems in deeply divided societies.
Thinking back to the causes of election violence, deeply divided societies face an
increased risk (Bates, 1983; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015; World Bank, 2018). A large
body of work on electoral systems considers how states with deep-rooted conflict respond
to varying electoral rules. Most of the literature here neglects the effects of mixed
systems in this area, choosing to focus on proportional representation versus
plurality/majoritarian systems.
One school of thought argues that the inclusive nature of the rules in PR systems
are best suited for divided societies, particularly in post-conflict settings (Lijphart, 2004;
Norris, 2008). Lijphart views PR systems as the best option for avoiding zero-sum
politics, and maximizing inclusion (Lijphart, 2004). Reynolds offers further evidence,
suggesting that majoritarian systems can impede minority representation (Reynolds,
2010).
On the other side, Donald Horowitz argues that PR systems may encourage the
solidification of narrow identities, worsening conflict in the long-run (Horowitz, 2003,
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2014). Furthermore, he suggests that the nature of more majoritarian-like rules forces
parties to form cross-cutting relationships among disparate (often ethnic) groups. Alonso
and Ruiz-Rufino argue that the case for PR is overstated, as it does not always promote
minority representation, nor moderate ethnic conflict (Alonso & Ruiz‐Rufino, 2007).
Most studies tend to emphasize the benefits of PR, though the debate over the effects of
electoral systems in this context is still relevant. More generally, it demonstrates the
importance of institutions.
While electoral systems matter, it is important to recognize that they are not solely
attributable to the many effects described above. Variation and debate found in the
literature shows that this is true (Horowitz, 2003; Lijphart, 2004). Bogaards admits that
even with the numerous studies arguing for the adoption of proportional representation,
there is little statistical evidence that it actually contributes to more inclusive political
institutions (Bogaards, 2013). His conclusion does not mean the PR systems are less
inclusive, just that additional study is warranted. Electoral systems exist as a series of
tradeoffs, not as a “panacea for all ills” (Reynolds, 1999; Sisk, 2017). Sisk notes that a
durable finding from Gallagher and Mitchell (2008) is that “no electoral system can
maximize all the desirable outcomes that should flow from an electoral process” (Sisk,
2017). Therefore, electoral systems should be considered alongside other structures and
institutions to determine their effects (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2005). In the context of
election-related violence, researchers must consider how electoral systems interact with a
multitude of other conflict causes. However, these institutions likely play a significant
role.
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Mobilization in Electoral Processes
A final, brief consideration regarding electoral violence deals with actor agency
and mobilization. As previously noted, the formal rules outlined by electoral systems can
influence party formation, general inclusion in the political system, and even the nature
of group interactions. All of these factors play a role in who will perpetrate violence, and
how it will take place. Regardless of the various incentives to perpetrate violence,
electoral violence is not possible without willing agents. Sisk and Spies note that while
individual acts are possible, most forms of chronic violence require “extensive
organization and mobilization” (Sisk & Spies, 2009). Mobilization in electoral processes
is a natural part of the cycle, and normally an aspect of acceptable democratic conflict.
However, in cases where violent elections are likely, mobilization dynamics act as a
driving force for conflict. Furthermore, the dynamics behind actor agency and
mobilization stem from interactions between institutions like electoral systems, and the
various factors involved in promoting violence.
Mobilization is closely related to both the causes of electoral violence, and
electoral institutions. In cases where party leaders, elites, or individuals face incentives to
commit violence, they often require larger mobilization or collective action to achieve
their goals. Klaus and Mitchell explain that most studies tend to overlook mobilization
dynamics. They also argue that local grievances play a key role in mobilization (Klaus &
Mitchell, 2015). The authors focus primarily on elite mobilization of the masses around
land issues, but offer useful insight into general elite mobilization. They find that
mobilizing violence around land grievances is only possible when constituents perceive
an imminent threat to current land rights, and an opportunity to strengthen those rights
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(Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). Applying this analysis more generally to grievances
demonstrates how institutions factor into mobilization. Leaders or ethnic entrepreneurs
that build on existing grievances will be able to mobilize actors based on perceptions of
exclusion and potential loss. If the electoral rules of the game strongly emphasize winners
and losers, elites (both incumbents and challengers) may find it easier to mobilize groups
for violence. Conversely, if PR systems actually solidify group identities like Horowitz
and others suggest, there may exist greater opportunities to summon mass support from
distinct groups. These unclear relationships warrant further study.
Other important considerations around mobilization deal with the conditions
necessary for other actors to perpetrate violence. In contexts where systems promote
distrust among voters with the electoral process (and fraud is noted), mass mobilization
and violent resistance to state authority becomes more likely (Sisk & Spies, 2009).

Theoretical Argument
Scholars are beginning to test the effects of electoral systems on election violence,
much like the work on conflict more broadly. In an earlier theoretical study, Höglund
echoes Lijphart, arguing that the winner-take-all style of majoritarian systems is conflict
inducing (Höglund, 2009). She follows this up (alongside Hannah Fjelde) with a large
quantitative study over the relationship between electoral systems and election related
violence in sub-Saharan Africa. The results of the second study relatedly demonstrate that
majoritarian voting rules and fewer elected legislatures are more frequently associated
with electoral violence (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016). These two studies indicate that

29

proportional representation may act as an institutional constraint on election violence. As
such, it is possible to derive the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: States with majoritarian electoral systems are at an elevated risk for
election violence overall.
This hypothesis can be further sub-divided based on the timing of violence. A
major limitation of Fjlde and Höglund’s study is a lack of timing dynamics (Fjelde &
Höglund, 2016). During their tests, they fail to account for the period on the election
cycle that violence occurred. Newer datasets exist that include temporal data, as well as
more specific data on the type of electoral violence and the dyadic relationship between
victims and offenders (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017). This study will attempt to test Fjelde
and Höglund’s conclusions against this new data.
Studies on coalition formation and violence helps further extend the theory
around electoral systems and the timing of violence. Again, focusing on proportional vs
majoritarian systems Pippa Norris explains that the timing of coalition formation is an
important distinction between the two groups (Norris, 1997). In majoritarian systems,
parties must engage in cross-group support to win elections, but can avoid any conflict
from coalition formation in the aftermath of elections. Conversely, PR systems often
require parties to form coalitions after elections (Norris, 1997).
Each system has distinct trade-offs. Majoritarian rules tend to produce stable
systems, and give voters a clearer picture of electoral outcomes. The downside here is
that minority groups are more easily excluded. With PR systems, outcomes are less clear,
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and coalition building can create tension. However, minority groups are better
represented. Given these distinctions, I propose an additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The probability of pre-electoral violence is greater with majoritarian
systems, while PR systems lead to a higher likelihood of violence in postelectoral periods.
Violence during elections is more commonly attributed to the stakes of
competition. Given the consequences of losing are higher in majoritarian systems, I
formulate one additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of violence during election days is higher in majoritarian
systems.
Along with the effects of formal institutions, I also investigate the role of informal
institutions. The prominence of neo-patrimonial relationships is well-documented
throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Fjelde & Höglund, 2016;
Höglund, 2009; Lodge, 2014). These relationships make up an important informal
institution that structures many socio-economic interactions. Furthermore, patron-client
relationships are highly political, and can change based on the composition of elected
officials (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016). States that rely more on neo-patrimonial systems are
therefore potentially at a higher risk for elections with high-stakes outcomes. As such, it
is possible to formulate a fourth hypothesis that tests the prevalence of violence in
contexts with powerful underlying informal rules:
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Hypothesis 4: The violence inducing effects of majoritarian systems remain when
controlling for neo-patrimonialism, which also leads to higher election
violence.
Finally, I look at how institutions work in the context of mobilization factors.
Neither electoral systems nor neo-patrimonial structures are entirely sufficient causes of
electoral violence. Without triggers or explicit mobilizing factors, violence will not occur.
Therefore, it is important to look at how systems respond in the presence of mobilizing
factors. The presence of election monitors, fraud, and exclusion of ethnics groups are all
closely associated with triggers of election violence (Burchard, 2015; Daxecker, 2012,
2014; Fjelde & Höglund, 2016; Smidt, 2016). Given this, I list one additional hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Majoritarian systems remain associated with increasing election violence
when controlling for mobilization-related factors (fraud, ethnic exclusion).
These five hypotheses are not explicitly challenging significant findings in the
literature, but attempt to add nuance to general understandings around election violence. I
now turn to a description of the data and methods designed to test each hypothesis.
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IV. Data and Methods
To assess the effects of electoral systems on election violence, I use a modified
cross-sectional time series dataset based on the Dataset for Countries at Risk for Electoral
Violence (CREV).6 As mentioned previously, this is largely a replication of Fjelde and
Höglund (2016), and it incorporates a similar set of variables. Like previous studies, I
limit the scope of analysis regionally to Sub-Saharan Africa, and temporally from 1995 to
2013. Limiting the study to this period and location helps control for a number of
potential confounding variables like the Cold War, and colonialism.
The CREV includes data on electoral violence from over 600 elections in 101
states, 24 of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 4.1 summarizes these states and the
number of included elections. Data for the CREV comes from the Integrated Crisis Early
Warning System (ICEWS), and is compiled automatically (a potential drawback; Birch &
Muchlinski, 2017). Countries deemed “fully consolidated,” with a Polity IV score of 10
are excluded from the dataset to help center the data around states most “at risk” for
electoral violence. Additionally, only states with at least 365 reported events per year
(from ICEWS) are included (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017). The limited number of African
states in the CREV is a noted drawback, and the results need to be interpreted with this in
mind.
6

This dataset is available online at:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1UsooXfTGF57i_UxTNJCV2bJQSM8mjihn?usp=sharing
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The main benefit of the CREV is its temporal coverage as well as actor and
violence-type differentiation for recorded events. The unit of observation in the version
of the CREV is election-month. The dataset records violent events in a 10-month period
around elections, helping map events in accordance with the electoral cycle. Additionally,
it notes both the type of violence and the actor-dyad involved in the event. Before the
CREV, these distinctions were lacking among prominent datasets used for analyzing
election violence. The African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD), the Social Conflict
Analysis Database (SCAD), and the UCDP GED, all fail to explicitly distinguish events
related to elections (Salehyan et al., 2012; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).
Table 4.1: States and Elections
Country
Angola
Burundi
Republic of Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
DR Congo
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
24 States

Elections
2
3
5
6
3
9
7
6
4
5
3
3
3
8
5
7
6
3
3
5
8
6
5
8
123 Elections
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is electoral violence, which is captured
through the CREV. To look more precisely at the effects of electoral violence, I control
for the timing, actors involved, and type of electoral violence. Theoretically, this fits
more closely with the definition presented in section 2. Election violence in a given
month is coded as either present or absent. The CREV includes data on the number of
violent events during the month, but fails to distinguish the magnitude of each event.
Creating a dichotomous violence variable helps standardize the data.
Timing is split between pre-election, election day, and post-election violence. The
pre-electoral period includes up to six months prior to an election. Though the preelectoral period is much longer than six months, going further back than six months risks
mixing explicitly political events with those tied to the election. Election-day events
include those during the month of the election. The CREV fails to distinguish events by
day, instead taking election-months as its unit of observation. Limiting this period to the
month of the election is as close to the actual day as the data allows. Finally, the postelectoral period includes the following three months after an election.
I distinguish two main types of actors: state and non-state. The CREV records
events between five actor-dyads, though they can be simplified into two types. Rather
than sorting by the dyadic-relationships, I choose to shrink actors into two clear groups
for model simplicity.
I code events of violence as either threats or attacks. This distinction is present in
the CREV. Additionally, coding threats and attacks is in line with the definition of
electoral violence explained previously. Threats refer to coercion and intimidation, and
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attacks refer to physical harm. Furthermore, violence in the state-based category is
perpetrated by state actors, while the non-state category includes violence from non-state
actors.
A first look at the data on election violence demonstrates several trends, though
none are able to explain sources of causes. Overall, non-state actors perpetrate more
electoral violence than state actors. Figure 4.1 shows the total number of events per actor.
Looking more closely at the type of violence, state actors are more frequently engage in
coercive threats, while non-state actors are more frequently engage in physical attacks.
This is shown in Figure 4.2. Widening the scope, and looking at the total number of
months each type of actor is engaged, the results are much more similar between the two.
Figure 4.1: Electoral Violence
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Figure 4.2: Number of Months with Electoral Violence
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
State Actors

Non-State Actors

Figure 4.3 shows that election violence has increased over the time-period under
review. The level of total violence fluctuates largely, but appears to indicate a slightly
positive trend. This trend remains even when controlling for the number of elections in a
given year (average violence per election over time). A linear regression on violence over
time suggests that the line of best fit does have a marginally positive slope, and is
significant at 99 percent. However, there are too many possible confounding variables to
verify the accuracy of this trend. For example, the limited number of African states
included in the CREV makes estimating the prevalence of violence potentially inaccurate.
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Figure 4.3: Yearly Reported Election Violence Events
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Figure 4.4: Average Yearly Events per Election
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Independent Variables
The first set of explanatory variables are directly related to electoral systems, and
address the first four hypotheses. Using Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) data, I
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assign an electoral system to each observation. IAEP lists four broad types, majoritarian,
plurality, proportional representation, and mixed systems (Wig, Hegre, & Regan, 2015).
Given the noted similarities between majoritarian and plurality systems (in both rules and
effects), I narrow the options from four to three (Wig et al., 2015). In line with Fjelde and
Hoglund (2016), I also include a variable for Mean District Member (MDM) size. This
variable is a measure of district magnitude, and helps capture the proportionality present
in each system. The MDM measure is taken from the Dataset of Political Institutions
(DPI; Cruz, Scartascini, & Keefer, 2018). Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of electoral
systems between states across each election.
Looking observationally at how systems and violence correlate gives mixed
results. Overall, election violence is most frequent among observations with majoritarian
systems. PR systems rank second, and mixed systems have the lowest numbers of
violence. Figure 4.6 describes this distribution. However, Figure 4.7 demonstrates how
this is misleading. When looking at average levels of violence per election, this trend is
opposite. Mixed systems appear to be relatively more violent than PR and majoritarian
systems, with majoritarian systems featuring the lowest numbers of violent events per
election.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Electoral Systems Among Recorded Elections
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Figure 4.6: Average Election Violence by System Type
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Figure 4.7: Average Violence by System per Election
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The fourth hypothesis, which considers the relationship between formal and
informal institutions, relies on a measure of neopatrimonialism. The neo-patrimonialism
variable comes from the recent work of Rachel Sigman and Staffan Lindberg. In a study
for the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, they conclude that neopatrimonialism
is not entirely unique in Africa, and can be measured through a combination of different
factors like regime corruption and clientelism (Sigman & Lindberg, 2017). I use the neopatrimonialism variable to control for the prevalence of patron-client relationships in
different states.7
Finally, I add variables for election fraud, election monitors, and ethnic exclusion
to test the fifth hypothesis. Ethnic exclusion comes from the Ethnic Power Relationships
(EPR) dataset, and describes the size of the largest politically excluded ethnic group. EPR

7

The messiness involved in measuring such a variable is a noted limitation and potential drawback with
this data.
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takes note of ethnic groups that do not engage in political (electoral) competition (Vogt et
al., 2015). My ethnic exclusion variable mirrors that from Fjelde and Höglund, and
measures the size of the largest excluded group in a given state across observations. Data
on election monitors, fraud, and competition comes from NELDA (Hyde & Marinov,
2012).

Control Variables
To make the statistical model as accurate as possible, I have included a number of
controls suggested by other related studies. These include population, GDP, armed
conflict, and previous election violence. Population and economic development (GDP)
statistics are from the United Nations’ National Accounts Main Aggregates Database
(United Nations, 2017). GDP is measured in purchasing power parity.
Using the UCDP armed conflict dataset, I create a control variable that notes if a
state is embroiled in armed conflict in a given observation. I only code events as armed
conflicts if two specifications are met. First, the conflict must be intrastate. Interstate
conflicts are excluded. Second, the year of observation must reach at least 1,000 battlerelated deaths in a given year. Finally, I control for previous experiences with election
violence. Controlling for former cases of election violence, I am following the literature
on civil war recurrence. Several scholars argue that previous experiences with civil war
leads to “conflict traps” strongly affecting the likelihood that conflict will reoccur
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Walter, 2004).
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Methods
To analyze the potential effects of electoral systems on election violence, I use
logistic regressions. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable necessitates this
form of analysis. The results are presented primarily as odds ratios, but also interpreted
through marginal effects as probabilities of increasing violence.
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V. Results
Election Violence and Electoral Systems
The first tests replicate Fjelde and Höglund’s analysis, and address the first
hypothesis. Overall, the results are similar to Fjelde and Höglund (2016), as majoritarian
systems tend to correlate with increasing odds of election violence. Tables 5.1 and 5.2
displays these results with odds-ratios as the main output.
Odds-ratios are notoriously misleading, but offer a sense of whether the odds of
achieving success in the dependent variable are more likely to occur. Values greater than
1 indicate that the odds of success increase, while values less than 1 indicate decreasing
odds of success. Success here is defined as electoral violence occurring. Continuous
variables (like population, GDP, and MDM) use 0 as a baseline of comparison, while
categorical variables (the electoral system types) hold one category as the basis of
comparison. In each output below, I use majoritarian systems as the reference category.8
Additionally, in several cases I look at the marginal effects within different
variables to assess the probability of increasing election violence. Given the difficulty
associated with interpreting odds-ratios, probability estimates are useful.
In general, majoritarian systems appear more correlated with election violence.
This relationship is significant, but not particularly strong. Higher odds of violence
8

Using different reference categories does not change the results, but can make different parts of the results
easier to see. For an example of an output with PR as the reference category see the appendix.
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correlate with majoritarian systems from government attacks and threats, and also nonstate attacks. Specifically, Model 1 demonstrates that the probability of government
attacks in majoritarian systems is nearly 8 percent higher compared to PR systems. Mixed
systems correlate with decreasing odds of violence for government threats, and non-state
attacks. The effects of population and GDP are relatively insignificant, but tend to
correlate with higher chances of violence in a few cases. When controlling for the
presence of armed violence during an election, the odds of violence increase for both
government and non-state attacks. GDP lacks any significant results for the electoral
system models. In every run, the presence of election violence in the previous month
significantly correlates with higher odds of violence.
Table 5.1: Electoral Systems & Government Electoral Violence
State Attacks
PR

Mixed

(1)
0.642*
(-2.01)

(2)

State Threats
(3)
(4)
1.202
(0.94)
0.500**
(-2.91)

0.622
(-1.92)
0.755***
(-4.07)

MDMlog

0.893*
(-1.97)

Populationlog

1.263
(1.59)

1.286
(1.74)

1.592***
(3.36)

1.622***
(3.53)

GDPlog

1.295*
(2.27)

1.389**
(2.63)

1.251*
(2.19)

1.163
(1.38)

3.268***

3.636***

1.031

0.921

(6.07)

(5.98)

(0.16)

(-0.41)

Armed
Conflict
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Dep. Var. t-1
N

3.480***
(6.32)
904

2.920***
(5.17)
852

2.833***
(6.17)
904

2.744***
(5.76)
852

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

As an additional measure, I test each model replacing electoral systems with mean
district magnitude (MDM). In the MDM models the results are much more significant.
The results (Models 2 and 4 in the first two tables) indicate that smaller district sizes are
associated with higher chances of election violence. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the
increasing probabilities of districts with a magnitude of 1, compared to larger, multimember districts. Altogether, these results are consistent with my hypothesis that election
violence is more likely among majoritarian systems (hypothesis 1). However, given the
effects of MDM, it is more accurate to say that disproportionality among electoral rules
associates with a greater risk for electoral violence. The next set of models examines how
these results change when controlling for the timing of violence.
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Table 5.2: Electoral Systems & Non-State Electoral Violence
Non-State Attacks
Non-State Threats
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
PR
0.723
0.720
(-1.62)
(-1.06)
Mixed

0.563*
(-2.57)

0.763
(-0.75)
0.798***
(-3.85)

MDMlog

0.776*
(-2.35)

Populationlog

1.313*
(2.00)

1.240
(1.63)

1.663*
(2.37)

1.327
(1.45)

GDPlog

1.123
(1.13)

1.203
(1.69)

1.098
(0.62)

1.393*
(2.09)

2.951***

3.307***

1.125

1.049

(5.41)

(5.53)

(0.45)

(0.17)

4.145***
(8.67)
904

3.250***
(6.95)
852

2.543**
(3.24)
904

2.751**
(3.15)
852

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Tables 5.3-5.5 display the results of different systems on the prevalence of
election violence during each period of the electoral cycle. Overall, differences in
electoral systems appear to be relatively insignificant. Majoritarian systems are more
highly correlated with violence for government threats and attacks, but only when
compared to mixed systems. This is potentially due to the smaller number of PR
elections. Theoretically, my hypothesis is more based on comparisons between PR and
majoritarian systems, as the theory behind mixed systems as a broad family is less clear.
These models still indicate the importance of previous experiences with election violence,
and the presence of armed violence.
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Figure 5.1: Marginal Effects of Magnitude on Election Violence
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Figure 5.1: The marginal effects of district magnitude demonstrate that as the natural log of MDM
increases (when lnMDM = 0, MDM = 1), the probability of violence decreases. This trend is
present in each model.
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Table 5.3: Electoral Systems and Pre-Election Violence
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
PR
0.766
0.964
0.662
0.911
(-0.94)
(0.24)
(-1.65)
(-0.25)
Mixed

0.822
(-0.61)

0.517*
(-2.11)

0.731
(-1.11)

0.686
(-0.82)

Populationlog

1.100
(0.52)

1.634**
(2.75)

1.037
(0.22)

1.123
(0.48)

GDPlog

1.433*
(2.39)

1.379*
(2.36)

1.233
(1.61)

1.395
(1.83)

3.503***

1.206

2.535***

1.352

(5.07)

(0.76)

(3.86)

(0.94)

5.290***
(5.62)
565

2.598***
(4.13)
565

4.858***
(7.20)
565

2.744**
(2.58)
565

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5.4: Electoral Systems and Election-day Violence
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
PR
0.596
1.779
0.499
0.420
(-0.83)
(0.97)
(-0.98)
(-0.93)
Mixed

0.290
(-1.67)

0.702
(-0.53)

0.286
(-1.60)

0.402
(-0.78)

Populationlog

0.871
(-0.35)

1.718
(1.37)

1.103
(0.22)

1.606
(0.82)

GDPlog

1.427
(1.11)

0.876
(-0.44)

0.937
(-0.19)

0.784
(-0.50)

8.699**

0.765

22.03**

1.176

(3.17)

(-0.45)

(2.77)

(0.22)

Armed
Conflict
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Dep. Var. t-1
N

2.465
(1.82)
96

4.638**
(3.21)
96

6.710***
(3.53)
96

3.923
(1.62)
96

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5.5: Electoral Systems and Post-Election Violence
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
PR
0.550
1.195
0.843
0.300
(-1.50)
(0.51)
(-0.47)
(-1.84)
Mixed

0.460
(-1.57)

0.373*
(-2.14)

0.323*
(-2.51)

0.848
(-0.26)

Populationlog

1.852*
(2.24)

1.433
(1.51)

1.547
(1.78)

2.061
(1.90)

GDPlog

1.181
(0.75)

1.244
(1.14)

1.115
(0.55)

1.062
(0.21)

2.584*

0.831

3.682***

0.869

(2.56)

(-0.53)

(3.41)

(-0.30)

3.468***
(3.42)
281

3.535***
(4.11)
281

3.080***
(3.72)
281

2.662
(1.95)
281

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Once again, replacing electoral systems with MDM teases out some significant
results. Table 5.6 displays the results of mean district magnitude on electoral violence in
different periods of the election cycle.9 Looking at instances of government attacks,
MDM is significant for pre-electoral periods. For non-state attacks, MDM is similarly
significant in pre-electoral periods, but also in post-electoral periods. The odds of higher

9

Table 6 excludes “election day” results. The models for this time period featured insignificant results.
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violence in pre-election periods is slightly more significant, but the relative effect on the
odds of violence is comparable. Moving to the control variables, the results are similar to
those found in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Armed violence tends to correlate with attacks,
regardless of timing in the election cycle. Looking at economic development, higher
levels of GDP correlate with higher chances of violence in pre-election periods, but more
commonly among non-state actors. This result appears counterintuitive, and deserves
further explanation in the discussion. Unlike GDP, population is more frequently
significant in post-election periods. Similar to the models in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the effect
of the dependent variable is significant and positive.
Table 5.6: District Magnitude and Election Violence
State Actors
Attacks
Violenc
e Period

Non-State Actors
Threats

Attacks

Threats

Pre (1)

Post (2)

Pre (3)

Post (4)

Pre (5)

Post (6)

Pre (7)

Post (8)

0.742**
(-3.16)

0.802
(-1.76)

0.877
(-1.73)

0.849
(-1.52)

0.819**
(-2.69)

0.782*
(-2.22)

0.886
(-0.99)

0.588*
(-2.02)

1.026

2.407**

1.621**

1.688*

1.041

1.683*

1.058

1.904

(0.14)

(2.89)

(2.63)

(2.07)

(0.24)

(2.07)

(0.23)

(1.73)

GDPlog

1.604**
(2.86)

1.002
(0.01)

1.333
(1.96)

1.044
(0.21)

1.396*
(2.38)

0.968
(-0.16)

1.618*
(2.38)

1.237
(0.70)

Armed
Conflict

3.208***
(4.19)

3.026**
(2.69)

1.126
(0.45)

0.775
(-0.68)

2.785***
(3.83)

3.567**
(3.09)

1.464
(1.11)

0.601
(-0.98)

Dep.
Var. t-1

4.327***

3.192**

2.286***

3.947***

3.513***

3.197***

2.858*

2.040

(3.71)
255

(2.40)
511

(1.42)
255

MDMlog

Populationlog

(4.63)
(3.08)
(3.47)
(4.22)
(5.55)
N
511
255
511
255
511
Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
No election-day model is significant
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Election Violence and Informal Institutions
To test the effects of informal institutions, I control for levels of clientelism, a
main feature of neo-patrimonial systems. Informal institutions are important to consider
alongside the formal electoral rules. As an additional condition, I am testing whether or
not the degree of clientelism in government matters for election violence. The literature
suggests that higher levels of clientelism (neo-patrimonialism), alongside majoritarian
systems, will correlate with increasing election violence.
Table 5.7 displays the results of four models using electoral systems as an
explanatory variable. Compared to mixed systems, the odds of violence (when
controlling for informal institutions) are higher under majoritarian systems in all cases
but non-state threats. The trends for armed conflict and previous election violence are
consistent with previous models. Clientelism is insignificant in each model.
Table 5.7: Electoral Systems, Informal Institutions, and Election Violence
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
0.732

1.229

0.680

0.641

(-1.45)

(1.07)

(-1.96)

(-1.51)

Mixed

0.595*
(-2.10)

0.473**
(-3.15)

0.552**
(-2.66)

0.646
(-1.24)

Clientelism

0.238
(-2.53)

0.441
(-1.57)

1.430
(0.70)

0.338
(-1.44)

Populationlog

1.332*
(1.97)

1.601***
(3.48)

1.168
(1.21)

1.420
(1.84)

GDPlog

1.266*
(2.02)

1.251*
(2.16)

1.169
(1.54)

1.161
(0.99)

3.482***

1.032

3.092***

1.208

PR

Armed
Conflict
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Dep. Var. t-1
N

(6.50)

(0.17)

(5.79)

(0.77)

3.550***
(6.44)
942

2.894***
(6.32)
942

4.044***
(8.58)
942

2.596***
(3.31)
942

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5.8 runs a variant of the same models in Table 5.7, but with MDM
replacing electoral system type. Like the first few tables, higher MDM sizes are
correlated with greater odds of election violence. Because patrimonial tendencies alone
are not sufficient for provoking violence, I run one further test, controlling for levels of
ethnic exclusion. Interestingly, the presence of clientelism is associated with higher odds
of violence for non-state attacks with the addition of ethnic exclusion. This model is
shown in Table 5.9.10
Table 5.8: District Magnitude, Informal Institutions, and Election Violence
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
MDMlog
0.747***
0.893*
0.798***
0.759*
(-4.10)
(-1.97)
(-3.85)
(-2.44)
Clientelism

0.244
(-2.45)

0.819
(-0.39)

0.980
(-0.04)

0.207
(-2.00)

Populationlog

1.327
(1.88)

1.630***
(3.53)

1.240
(1.63)

1.360
(1.54)

GDPlog

1.345*
(2.33)

1.158
(1.33)

1.202
(1.68)

1.317
(1.68)

3.904***

0.929

3.309***

1.210

(6.25)

(-0.36)

(5.53)

(0.69)

2.898***
(5.11)

2.745***
(5.76)

3.250***
(6.95)

2.709**
(3.09)

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1

10

The full set of models with the additional of ethnic exclusion are available in the appendix.
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N

852

852

852

852

Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5.9: Electoral Systems, Informal Institutions, and Ethnic Exclusion
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
PR
0.574*
0.962
0.391***
0.386*
(-2.05)
(-0.15)
(-3.63)
(-2.31)
Mixed

0.843
(-0.40)

0.657
(-1.08)

0.412*
(-2.24)

0.678
(-0.65)

Clientelism

0.471
(-1.11)

0.731
(-0.49)

4.366*
(2.29)

0.221
(-1.46)

Ethnic
Exclusion

0.153
(-2.46)

1.058
(0.09)

0.754
(-0.46)

0.0282
(-2.40)

Populationlog

1.022
(0.15)

1.449*
(2.51)

1.028
(0.20)

1.068
(0.31)

GDPlog

1.579**
(3.24)

1.395*
(2.56)

1.246
(1.70)

1.386
(1.79)

2.739***

1.057

2.372***

1.175

(4.49)

(0.25)

(3.66)

(0.59)

3.098***
(4.51)
603

3.889***
(5.81)
603

5.129***
(7.21)
603

1.805
(1.54)
603

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

I also test the effect of informal institutions during different election-periods. The
results of these tests are largely insignificant, expect for non-state attacks in the preelection period (for both systems and MDM). Majoritarian systems correlate positively
with violence, PR systems correlate negatively, and district magnitude is associated with
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less violence as the size increases. Table 5.10 displays these models. A full list of tables
is available in the appendix.
Table 5.10: Electoral Institutions, Informal Institutions, and Pre-Election Violence
State Actor Attacks
Non-State Actor Attacks
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
PR
0.817
0.601*
(-0.70)
(-2.01)
Mixed

0.802
(-0.68)

0.769
(-0.92)
0.727**
(-3.24)

MDMlog

0.820**
(-2.66)

Clientelism

0.226*
(-2.01)

0.197*
(-2.14)

4.985*
(2.47)

2.748
(1.56)

Populationlog

1.164
(0.80)

1.045
(0.22)

1.000
(-0.00)

1.037
(0.21)

GDPlog

1.353
(1.95)

1.557**
(2.62)

1.277
(1.86)

1.416*
(2.47)

3.549***

3.533***

2.528***

2.720***

(5.10)

(4.46)

(3.83)

(3.71)

5.404***
(5.65)
565

4.450***
(4.68)
511

4.841***
(7.16)
565

3.470***
(5.49)
511

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Election Violence and Mobilization
A final set of tests consider electoral systems in the context of mobilizing factors.
Table 5.11 looks at this broadly, and shows that majoritarian systems are associated with
higher chances of violence for government and non-state attacks (compared to PR).
Looking at the marginal effects, the probability of election violence (state-led attacks) is
nearly 10 percent higher in majoritarian systems compared to PR or mixed. This
difference is greater than the models excluding mobilization factors. Fraud also correlates
with increasing violence for government threats and non-state attacks. For government
threats, the presence of international election observers is correlated with greater chances
of violence. The competitiveness of elections is generally insignificant, except for nonstate attacks. Here, increasing competitiveness decreases the odds of violence. Armed
violence and the lagged dependent variable retain effects seen in the previous models.
Running the same tests for district magnitude demonstrates that every model
except for non-state threats features declining odds of violence as magnitude increases.
The only other difference is that competitiveness loses significance. These results are on
display in Table 5.12.
Finally, I look at mobilization factors in the context of timing, and find that there
are key differences between pre and post-electoral periods. Table 5.13 displays the results
of mobilization factors in pre-electoral periods. This table shows results for MDM runs as
the models including systems lack significance. In pre-election periods, government
attacks and threats, and non-state attacks have greater chances of emerging as reports of
election fraud increase. Interestingly, the presence of election monitors leads to more

56

government threats. However, this is possibly a reporting effect, where more violent
threats are reported because international monitors are present to report such events.
Table 5.11: Electoral Institutions, Mobilization, and Violence
Government Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
PR
0.597*
1.218
0.700
0.562
(-2.19)
(0.95)
(-1.68)
(-1.60)
Mixed

0.575
(-1.77)

0.472*
(-2.47)

0.691
(-1.39)

0.935
(-0.15)

Fraud

1.527
(1.84)

2.183***
(3.79)

2.202***
(3.69)

1.301
(0.85)

International
Monitors

1.274
(0.71)

1.894*
(1.96)

1.252
(0.77)

2.125
(1.30)

Competitive

0.835
(-0.56)

1.251
(0.77)

0.440*
(-2.51)

1.378
(0.66)

Ethnic
Exclusion

0.992
(-1.36)

0.994
(-1.20)

0.990*
(-2.07)

0.994
(-0.64)

Populationlog

1.032
(0.17)

1.213
(1.19)

0.939
(-0.39)

1.444
(1.35)

GDPlog

1.258
(1.67)

1.207
(1.59)

1.253
(1.86)

1.084
(0.45)

3.515***

1.495

3.663***

1.246

(5.42)

(1.76)

(5.55)

(0.68)

3.161***
(5.44)
800

2.534***
(5.16)
800

3.535***
(7.26)
800

2.427**
(2.80)
800

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 5.12: District Magnitude, Mobilization, and Violence
State Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
MDMlog
0.739***
0.860*
0.763***
0.818
(-3.81)
(-2.26)
(-3.94)
(-1.67)
Fraud

1.451
(1.56)

2.235***
(3.80)

2.081***
(3.34)

1.212
(0.59)

International
Monitors

1.121
(0.35)

2.452**
(2.87)

1.052
(0.18)

1.656
(0.90)

Competitive

1.002
(0.01)

0.961
(-0.12)

0.546
(-1.68)

1.412
(0.69)

Ethnic
Exclusion

0.996
(-0.70)

1.002
(0.30)

0.991
(-1.67)

0.998
(-0.19)

Populationlog

1.099
(0.50)

1.190
(1.01)

1.052
(0.30)

1.484
(1.41)

GDPlog

1.292
(1.86)

1.187
(1.44)

1.260
(1.90)

1.139
(0.73)

4.585***

1.299

4.828***

1.392

(5.95)

(1.09)

(6.26)

(0.96)

2.886***
(4.94)
763

2.457***
(4.89)
763

3.108***
(6.39)
763

2.485**
(2.78)
763

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients (odds-ratios); z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The only notable effect of ethnic exclusion is that non-state attacks actually
decrease when the size of the largest excluded group increases. However, the odds-ratio
is nearly 1 (meaning the chances of increasing or decreasing violence are close to equal),
and both positive and negative effects fall within the 95% confidence interval.
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The post-election period similarly displays that larger districts are associated with
less violent elections, but the other mobilization variables lose their significance. This
table is available in the appendix.
Table 5.13: District Magnitude, Mobilization, and Violence in Pre-Election Periods
Government Actors
Non-State Actors
Attacks (1)
Threats (2)
Attacks (3)
Threats (4)
MDMlog
0.761*
0.807*
0.809*
0.935
(-2.46)
(-2.32)
(-2.46)
(-0.49)
Fraud

2.016*
(2.11)

2.286**
(2.92)

2.416**
(3.03)

1.514
(0.94)

International
Monitors

1.180
(0.36)

3.539**
(2.63)

0.786
(-0.67)

1.000
(0.00)

Competitive

0.917
(-0.19)

0.927
(-0.18)

0.539
(-1.41)

1.483
(0.61)

Ethnic
Exclusion

0.984
(-1.87)

1.004
(0.60)

0.981**
(-2.70)

0.996
(-0.33)

Populationlog

0.756
(-1.12)

1.140
(0.56)

0.887
(-0.55)

0.945
(-0.17)

GDPlog

1.560*
(2.35)

1.378*
(1.98)

1.522**
(2.63)

1.348
(1.33)

4.904***

1.673

3.989***

2.346*

(4.63)

(1.58)

(4.37)

(2.03)

4.452***
(4.41)
457

1.944**
(2.61)
457

3.374***
(5.11)
457

2.485*
(2.03)
457

Armed
Conflict
Dep. Var. t-1
N

Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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VI. Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion
The original question under investigation in this study was whether certain
electoral systems are more vulnerable to election violence than others. There is currently
a heated debate around the utility of different families of electoral systems (Horowitz,
2003; Lijphart, 1991; Norris, 1997; Reilly, 2006; Reynolds, 2009; Sisk, 2017), yet very
little statistical evidence in support of either side (Bogaards, 2013). More recently some
have offered preliminary evidence that majoritarian systems are more conflict-inducing
than PR or mixed systems (Birch, 2005; Burchard, 2015; Fjelde & Höglund, 2016), but
fail to recognize whether these findings remain clear when controlling for the timing of
violence in relation to electoral periods. This study demonstrates that even when
controlling for timing, informal institutions, and mobilizing factors, majoritarian systems
remain the most closely correlated system with violence. Furthermore, I find that PR
systems actually decrease the odds that violence will emerge.

Hypotheses 1-3: Effects of Electoral Systems
The overall findings suggest that majoritarian systems create the conditions for
violence more than their PR and mixed counterparts. Furthermore, PR and mixed systems
tend to reduce the chances that election violence will emerge. These findings support
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hypothesis 1: States with majoritarian electoral systems are at an elevated risk for
election violence overall. This also reinforces previous findings in the literature (Fjelde &
Höglund, 2016), and resonates with PR arguments around deeply divided societies
(Lijphart, 2004; Reynolds, 2009). While the broad look at systems and violence is unable
to capture causality, this correlation is likely linked to the winner-take-all style of rules,
creating high stakes for the losers of electoral competition. However, the results above
suggest nuance is important.
Turning to the second hypothesis, electoral systems are associated with election
violence at different times in the election cycle. I hypothesized: the probability of preelectoral violence will be greater with majoritarian systems, while PR systems will lead
to higher chances of violence in post-electoral periods. For state actors, majoritarian
systems are only associated with a higher probability of election violence in the preelectoral period. For non-state actors, the risk of violence is greater regardless of timing.
Again, these findings highlight the theory emphasizing the high-stakes of elections as a
cause of violence. In pre-election periods, state actors in majoritarian contexts are
required to engage in conflictual actions (often violence) to attain a majority of votes.
Non-state actors either fearing exclusion or retaliating results of a winner-takes-all
election are subject to similar dynamics.
There is some evidence that PR systems associate with greater chances for
violence in post-election periods, but the lack of significance suggests otherwise. A more
useful comparison might look at the marginal effects of PR systems between pre and
post-election periods. This would help link arguments of post-election coalition
formation with PR systems to violence (or not).
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Noting that PR systems are associated with decreasing chances of violence overall
is an important finding and contribution. Whereas other studies confirm the relationship
between violence and majoritarian systems, they neglect the nature of PR systems. My
analysis leaves room for PR systems. Using MDM as a proxy for rules, I find that PR
systems actually decrease the odds of violence. This suggests that the post-election
coalition forming process is not necessarily more violent, and greater more proportional
representation in government helps reduce the violence-provoking high stakes of
elections. I also find in many cases that mixed systems decrease the probability of
electoral violence. However, disentangling this effect will require a more detailed look in
to the particular type of mixed systems and contexts where this occurs.
Hypothesis 3 states: The likelihood of violence during election days is higher in
majoritarian systems. This is neither confirmed nor denied in the results.

Hypothesis 4: Informal Institutions
Turning to informal institutions, I find that systems with smaller district
magnitudes are at higher risk for election violence when controlling for informal
institutions like neo-patrimonialism. This supports hypothesis 4, which states: The
violence inducing effects of majoritarian systems remain when controlling for neopatrimonialism, which also leads to higher election violence.
Neo-patrimonialism itself is described as another condition that raises the stakes
of elections. Chabal and Daloz explain that when these systems come under threat,
violence is more likely (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). When adding ethnic exclusion into the
mix, neo-patrimonialism appears to increase violence, but only for non-state attacks.
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Hypothesis 5: Mobilization Factors
For my final hypothesis, I consider the role of electoral systems on violence in the
presence of noted mobilizing factors. I hypothesized that: Majoritarian systems will
remain associated with increasing election violence when controlling for mobilizationrelated factors. The results support this hypothesis. MDM helps make these findings
clear, which remain true in both pre and post-electoral periods.
Additionally, fraud and election monitors are positively correlated with violence,
while election competitiveness decreases the risk of violence. These effects change with
timing for different actors, however. While allegations of fraud promote violence among
state and non-state actors in pre-electoral periods, the effects of fraud are only significant
with state actors in post-electoral periods. Whereas much of the literature emphasizes the
violent reactions of non-state actors to fraud, this finding suggests that state-led efforts in
dealing with fraud (preserving legitimacy, ironically through violence), are also important
(Claes, 2016; Daxecker, 2012).
The findings also suggest that election monitors increase the odds state actors will
engage in violence in pre-electoral periods. Specifically, state actors engage more in
threats. This finding contrasts with Smidt (2016), who finds that states are actually less
likely to engage in pre-election violence with observers because of the high risks of
international exposure. This finding may indicate that state actors still engage in
manipulative and violent behavior when monitors are present, but that this behavior is
more discrete.
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Additional Findings
Outside of the general findings on electoral systems, there are three other notable
findings worth mentioning. The first concerns GDP. Counterintuitively, increasing levels
of GDP ppp tend to correlate more with higher levels of election violence. This seems to
provide evidence against “modernization” theories, but may also be misleading. GDP can
often obscure the ways wealth is distributed throughout society. Data limitations on
income inequality made its inclusion in this analysis problematic, but controlling for
inequality might help explain this finding.
Second, armed violence is a strong predictor of election violence, and specifically
attacks, regardless of timing and actor. While this is expected, it also demonstrates how
perceptions over the use of violence as a political tool change in conflict prone states.
Third, past experiences with election violence are also key in determining the
presence of future violence. This finding may indicate a vicious cycle of election
violence.
One final finding worth noting concerns district magnitude (the MDM variable).
MDM is an important measure when looking at electoral systems, and is often a more
significant predictor of election violence than the electoral system variable. The variation
even within electoral systems families may necessitate the use of variables like MDM
when assessing the effects of electoral systems in future studies.

Limitations
The main limitation of this study relates to the scope of the data. Given the CREV
only covers 24 sub-Saharan states, there is some question over how well these findings
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will translate to the continent as a whole, or other regions. Additionally, the limited
experience with PR among most states may skew some of the findings. Looking
specifically at majoritarian systems, the causal path to violence may come from
additional factors, such as its close association with presidentialism.
Furthermore, the high-level quantitative nature of the study and its findings
requires a reading that emphasizes correlation over causation. This is true of most
statistical studies, but nonetheless a limitation. Without looking more closely at the cases
highlighted by this study’s findings, a fully comprehensive picture of violence is still
unclear. However, the findings do well to complement the existing literature on election
violence and electoral systems,

Areas for Future Research
This study begins a broad assessment into the relationship between electoral
systems and election violence, but has room to expand. Building on these general
findings, future research must begin to look at this relationship on many different levels.
To help link causality, GIS mapping of majority coalition-making with areas of election
violence could be useful. If coalition formation in pre-electoral periods is truly more
conflict inducing, then these maps would augment this finding.
Nearly every analysis on electoral systems and election violence focuses on subSaharan Africa. Future studies should investigate if the findings from this region hold up
elsewhere. Between countries, a smaller-n, structured focused comparison that
investigates the ways electoral systems constrain behaviors would help compliment and
add thoroughness to the findings presented here.
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Additionally, future research can focus on state experiences with election violence
after altering electoral systems. Finally, a rigorous investigation into the effects of mixed
systems would compliment the findings presented in this study.

Conclusion
When questioning the role of institutions in election violence, I clearly
demonstrate that majoritarian electoral systems have an effect. This effect (increasing
probabilities of violence) largely remains regardless of actor and the timing around
elections. However, no single electoral system can determine whether elections in a given
state will experience violence. The results of this study must not be interpreted through a
deterministic lens. Even though majoritarian systems tend to correlate with greater
violence, they are not necessarily the primary cause of conflict. Furthermore, the
adoption of PR rules does not ensure violence will remain absent. Repeating Reynolds,
electoral systems do not come as a “panacea for all ills” (Reynolds, 1999). Policymakers
must remain aware of this. Yet at the same time, the rules within certain systems do
influence how electoral actors behave. Recognizing this balance is invaluable when
studying the causes of election violence.
These findings are particularly important for states in transitional periods. In
contexts where electoral strife is a problem, more proportional rules may help alleviate
violence and instability. Organizational engagement (such as the UN or AU) in at-risk or
post-conflict states often involves electoral system design. These interactions should
emphasize the importance of adopting PR systems. This will help continue to decrease
the conditions conducive to election violence.
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Appendix
Additional tables, figures, and the original dataset I use in this study are in an online
appendix available at:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1UsooXfTGF57i_UxTNJCV2bJQSM8mjihn?usp=
sharing
Folder A includes every figure listed, as well as unused figures offering more descriptive
data from the dataset.
Folder B includes every table in the preceding pages, as well as additional tables that
display results for every model in different periods of the election cycle.
Folder C houses the dataset for this study, and an accompanying codebook. The data file
is available for Microsoft Excel, and Stata.
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